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Introduction
The early 1980s— when “politics and ideology . . . turned arse-over-tit,”
as E.P. Thompson once described it— was, in the less colorful language of
David Harvey, a “revolutionary turning point in the world’s social and eco-
nomic history.”1  Law was not immune to the sweeping changes taking
place.2  Until the 1980s, and over the previous half century, law had served
† Joel Bakan is a writer and professor at the Peter A. Allard School of Law at the
University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada.  The author is grateful to Natasha
Affolder, Myim Bakan Kline, Paul Bakan, John Fellas, Matt James, Rebecca Jenkins,
Patrick Macklem, James Stewart, and Galit Sarfaty for their helpful comments and
insights on earlier drafts, and to Noah Stewart for his excellent research assistance.
Some of the ideas in this paper were discussed in “Beyond CSR - Exploring New
Challenges,” a plenary speech delivered at a conference at the Centre for Corporate
Responsibility, BI Norwegian Business School, 14 November 2012, and in a debate
among George Monbiot, Torger Reve, Caroline Taylor, Atle Midttun and the author at
that conference.  Excerpts from both appear in Debating CSR, Democracy and Value
Creation, in CSR AND BEYOND, A NORDIC PERSPECTIVE 411, 415– 20 (Atle Midttun ed.,
2013).
1. E. P. THOMPSON, WRITING BY CANDLELIGHT 211 (1980); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF
HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005), quoted in JOEL BAKAN, CHILDHOOD UNDER SIEGE: HOW
BIG BUSINESS TARGETS YOUR CHILDREN 9 (2011) [hereinafter BAKAN, CHILDHOOD UNDER
SIEGE].
2. By “law” I refer to mandatory legal systems composed of rules, principles, and
standards promulgated and enforced by sovereign state institutions, and recognized as
authoritative and binding within their jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ronen Shamir, Capitalism,
Governance, and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility, 6 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 531, 534 (2010) [hereinafter Shamir, Capitalism, Governance and Authority].
While pluralist, cosmopolitan, and postmodern approaches to law eschew rigid demar-
cations of law from other kinds of collective normativity, for the purposes of this
paper— which traces the significance of the distinction between mandatory public law
and voluntary private regulation— neglecting that demarcation would beg all the relevant
questions. See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: RETHINKING LEGAL-
ITY, LEGITIMACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 44 (2012).  I agree, for these purposes, with Jean
L. Cohen’s characterization of the critique of legal pluralism: “By attaching the label
‘law’ indiscriminately to any form of coordinated rule-making,” she says, “legal pluralists
tend to collapse the distinction between law and regulation, dissolve the legal code into
48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279 (2015)
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(albeit unevenly and incompletely) as the main institutional vehicle for
policing corporations in aid of public interests, thereby protecting people,
communities, and the environment from corporate excess and malfea-
sance.3  Over the course of the 1980s and thereafter, however, law’s protec-
tive role began to diminish, and privately promulgated voluntary regimes
(hereinafter “private regulation”4) emerged in its place.5
Importantly, no such diminishment occurred in relation to law’s par-
allel and prominent role in protecting corporations and their interests.
Here, state legal regimes continued to operate as robustly as ever; incorpo-
rate companies; establish their mandates; protect their rights as “persons”;
shield their managers, directors, and shareholders from legal liability; com-
pel their officers to prioritize their “best interests” (typically construed as
increasing shareholder value); articulate and enforce their contract and
property rights; and repress dissidents and protesters who opposed their
growing power.  Corporations— indeed, corporate capitalism— could not
exist without these legal foundations and supports, which taken together
represent a massive infusion of state legal power into society.
Despite that massive infusion, many private regulation advocates and
commentators presume that globalization eviscerates state legal power,
and prescribe, on that basis, that private regimes should take law’s place.6
This Article challenges that presumption and prescription.  Following
examination of the rise of private regulation in Part I, Part II reveals how
private regulation advocacy and commentary often obscure, and effectively
render invisible, law’s robust role in constituting and protecting corpora-
tions, thereby exaggerating globalization’s alleged diminishment of state
legal power.  Part III claims that private regulation weakens the rule of law
and its democratic potential, with the effect, Part IV explains, of exacerbat-
ing corporate threats to public interests.
one among many normative-regulatory regimes, reduce legal decisions to policy choices,
and thereby lose sight of the critical point of the exercise.” See id. (paraphrasing, she
notes, Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2007)).
3. Cf. Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the
Labyrinth 1, 1 (Ctr. Eur. Pol’y Stud., Working Paper No. 370, 2012) [hereinafter Cafaggi
& Renda, Labyrinth].
4. I use the term “private regulation,” rather than “transnational private regulation”
(a common term in the literature) to connote that self-regulation and other forms of
private regulation are advocated and active within states, as well as within international
realms. See Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World-Culture or
World-Capitalism?, 45 L. & SOC. REV. 313, 313 (2011) [hereinafter Shamir, Socially
Responsible Private Regulation].
5. See Cafaggi & Renda, Labyrinth, supra note 3, at 1– 2, 7.  While private regula-
tion is often referred to in the literature as “soft law,” I treat it as a non-legal albeit
normative and regulatory practice, following the definition of law stated in note 2. Cf.
Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & SOC. 20,
36 (2011) [hereinafter Cafaggi, New Foundations].
6. Notably, the literature on private regulation is vast and varied: while some com-
mentators advocate its virtues and prescribe it, others limit their work to describing and
analyzing its development, and still others are critical of it.  Cafaggi & Renda, Labyrinth,
supra note 3, at 4– 5.  This paper challenges the first group of scholars, draws upon the
second, and is sympathetic to the third.
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I. The Rise of Private Regulation
Over the last several decades, a rapidly expanding network of private
regulation regimes has emerged to create a new mode of international gov-
ernance.7  Taking a variety of forms, these regimes vary in their complex-
ity, the range of organizations they include, and the degree to which they
are monitored and enforced.8  Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and
related self-regulation programs rely upon voluntary standards and codes
of conduct, promulgated by companies and industry groups, and some-
times monitored by third-party agencies.9  NGO-led regimes invite outside,
albeit private, agencies to set voluntary standards in cooperation with com-
panies and industry groups, and often include monitoring mechanisms
and reporting requirements.10  Expert-led models feature organizations,
such as the International Organization for Standardization, which estab-
lish norms for different industries and for industry as a whole.11  Multi-
stakeholder models involve collaborations among companies, NGOs,
expert groups, industry associations, and governments to set and monitor
standards (though, importantly, governments in these regimes serve as
partners and supports rather than sovereign or legal regulators, thus
eschewing traditional regulator-regulated hierarchies).12
While in theory private regulation norms may complement or crystal-
lize into legal norms, in practice the gains of private regulation often come
at the expense of public norms, “push[ing] the once-central ‘official’ or
state law to the global edge,” as Muir-Watt describes it.13  “Widespread
advocacy for forms of private regulation in lieu of public regulation,”
according to Caffagi and Renda, has lead “governments [to] award priority
7. See TIM BU¨THE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 1– 2 (2011); Saskia Sassen, The State and Globaliza-
tion, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91, 91 (Rodney B.
Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Interna-
tional Regulation Without International Government: Improving IO Performance Through
Orchestration, 5 REV. INT. ORGAN. 2 (2010); Larry Cata´ Backer, Private Actors and Public
Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board
and the Global Governance Order, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 751 (2011); Horatia
Muir-Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism, 2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 347,
347 (2011).
8. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 7, at 4– 9 (for a comprehensive review of these vari-
ous types of regimes, with numerous examples).
9. See, e.g., id. at 7, 38 (describing GAP’s individual labor rights scheme of 1992
and the International Council on Mining and Metals sustainable development principles
of 2003).
10. See, e.g., id. (describing the Rugmark labeling scheme, created in 1994 to control
child labor in the carpet industry; the CERES principles on environmental practice and
reporting; and Amnesty International’s Human Rights guidelines for Companies).
11. See, e.g., Fillipo Fontanelli, ISO and Codex Standards and International Trade
Law: What Gets Said is Not What’s Heard, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 895, 900 (2011) (dis-
cussing various industry standards promulgated by the International Organization for
Standardization).
12. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 7, at 2, 40 (discussing the 1997 Global
Reporting Initiative’s standards for social and environmental reporting and the 2004
World Fair Trade Organization’s standards for fair trade).
13. Muir-Watt, supra note 7, at 352.
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to self- and co-regulatory solutions,” which in turn results in “key policy
domains . . . increasingly be[ing] left in the remit of private players, with
limited or no interference by public policymakers.”14  Private regulation
therefore often “operate[s] as a substitute for public regulation,” and, more
than that, companies strategically deploy it “with a clear objective to pre-
empt and avoid public regulation.”15  For example, Frynas describes how
oil companies invoked self-regulation initiatives to “stave off mandatory
regulation” concerning compensation for spills.16  Waters shows how
Coca-Cola’s recent health initiatives were designed “to stave off regulatory
changes (a proposed soda tax) . . . by embracing voluntary, self-enforced
corporate initiatives.”17  Similar examples are legion, reflecting broad-
based corporate practice and advocacy in favor of private regimes, pro-
pelled mainly by corporate self-interest, though defended by companies as
more effective than public regimes for protecting public interests.18
Many commentators similarly believe (though not for the same self-
interested reasons) that private regimes can be more effective than their
public counterparts.19  This is especially so, they argue, in a world where
globalization has significantly diminished the authority of states to regu-
late multinational corporations (MNCs).20  MNCs operate transnationally
14. Cafaggi & Renda, Labyrinth, supra note 3, at 1– 2.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Jedrzej G. Frynas, Corporate Social Responsibility or Government Regulation? Evi-
dence on Oil Spill Prevention, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC. 4 (2012).
17. Rob Waters, Coca-Cola’s “Frank Statement” A Slick Move To Stave Off Regulation,
FORBES, May 21, 2013.
18. Shamir, Capitalism, Governance, and Authority, supra note 2, at 544; See also
BAKAN, CHILDHOOD UNDER SIEGE, supra note 1, at 57– 64.
19. Cafaggi & Renda, Labyrinth, supra note 3, at 28 (“Private regulation is emerging
as a viable solution for a number of problems faced by contemporary societies, and can
be superior to traditional command and control regulation due to informational asym-
metries, superior coordination, the need for trans-national cooperation and standardiza-
tion, and also the superior flexibility and adaptability of de-ossified, privately
implemented, designed and enforced rules”).
20. See, e.g., Cafaggi, New Foundations, supra note 5, at 23 (“The growth of TPR is
often associated, if not made dependent upon, the shortcomings of the regulatory state
as a global regulator”); id. at 25 (“Consensus exists over the weaknesses of nation states
in regulating markets that operate across state boundaries.  Similarly, the difficulties of
individual states in securing compliance with fundamental rights have been under-
lined.”).  Cafaggi & Renda, Labyrinth, supra note 3, at 5 (“The weaknesses of public
regulation emerge more specifically at the transnational level where difficulties to coor-
dinate, inconsistency between standard setting and enforcement, divergences between
administrative and judicial enforcement and within the latter among domestic courts
make transnational public regulation an insufficient response”). See also Monbiot et al.,
Debating CSR, Democracy and Value Creation, in CSR AND BEYOND: A NORDIC PERSPECTIVE
428 (Atle Mindttun ed., 2013) (“Strong democratic national regulation [is] highly prob-
lematic.  I believe this regulatory paradise was lost with globalization and that even
national states only have partial control over industry which operates across bor-
ders . . . .  [A] return to strong national regulation is difficult, if not outright impossi-
ble.”); Abbott and Snidal, supra note 7, at 1– 2 (“old international regulation”— state-led
legality— is inevitably in decline, making necessary “new transnational regulation”— “the
promulgation and implementation of non-legally-binding standards of behavior, applica-
ble directly to private actors . . . in settings that have traditionally called for mandatory
regulation”); Paul Verbruggen, Gorillas in the Closet? Public and Private Actors in the
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in a globalized economy, and can thus elude domestic legal systems, they
argue.21  International law is of no help because corporations, as non-state
actors, lie outside its traditional jurisdiction.22  The resulting “regulatory
gap,” they say, should be filled with private regulation23 (though they tend
to disagree on exactly how that should be done: what types of regimes work
best in which situations; what lines of cooperation among states, interna-
tional organizations, NGOs, and corporations are optimal; and whether,
and to what extent, private regulations do and should crystallize into
enforceable legal standards24).  In the next Part, I argue that the presump-
tion underlying these views— namely, that states’ regulatory authority has
been diminished by globalization— is intelligible only if important exer-
cises of that authority are rendered invisible.
II. The Invisible Hand of Law
“[T]he general movement away from traditional state control of the
commanding heights [of the economy] continues, leaving it more to the
realm of the market,” observe Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw in their
seminal work, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy.25
By implication, Yergin and Stanislaw presume that the “realm of the mar-
Enforcement of Transnational Private Regulation, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 512, 513 (2013)
(“[T]ransnational private regulation has emerged as a response to the lack, paucity or,
outright failure of international state governance arrangements”); Backer, supra note 7,
at 754– 55, noting:
But globalization, with its de-emphasis on the integrity of the territorial borders
of states, destroyed the old presumption of a substantially complete identity
between subjects and objects of regulation.  Because such private entities, espe-
cially large non-state actors, could avoid regulation in one single state by
extending their operations into the territory of other states, it became easier for
these entities to avoid political regulation and substitute themselves as new regu-
lators of behavior, each within the scope of its enterprise operation.
See also Deirdre Curtin & Linda Senden, Public Accountability of Transnational Private
Regulation: Chimera or Reality?, 38 J. L. & SOC. 163, 168 (2011).  Curtin and Senden
explain:
Furthermore, increasing globalization— economic trade, environmental, crimi-
nal, migration problems, and so on— has put a strain on national public regula-
tion as an instrumental tool to steer economy and society, while transnational
public structures and mechanisms for decision-making are not sophisticated
enough to tackle these effectively.  Self-regulation may then be resorted to out of
sheer necessity or public actors may have to fall back on or cooperate with pri-
vate actors to tackle a cross-border problem effectively, by bringing about some
form of regulation, monitoring, and compliance mechanisms.
21. Backer, supra note 7, at 754– 55.
22. Some suggest international law should, and increasingly does, recognize non-
state actors and subjects, and that this approach should be pursued as an avenue for
restoring public regulation of corporations, albeit at the international level. See Patrick
Macklem, Corporate Accountability under International Law: The Misguided Quest for Uni-
versal Jurisdiction, 7 INT’L. L. FORUM DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 281 (2005) (offering a dis-
cussion and critique of this view).
23. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 7, at 1– 2; Cafaggi, New Foundations, supra note
5, at 23; Cafaggi & Renda, Labyrinth, supra note 3, at 5.
24. See, e.g., Cafaggi, New Foundations, supra note 5, at 25.
25. As cited in JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT
AND POWER 154 (2004) [hereinafter BAKAN, THE CORPORATION],
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ket” is something different than, indeed separate from, “traditional state
control”— a presumption similarly implied by most arguments in favor of
private regulation.26  As a consequence of globalization, those arguments
hold, MNCs (the “realm of the market”) are able to elude state law (“tradi-
tional state control”) and that, in turn, makes necessary the introduction of
non-state, private regulatory measures.27  When Abbott and Snidal
describe “traditional state-based mechanisms” and “mandatory regulation”
solely in terms of laws that constrain corporations, but not those that pro-
tect and enable them, law’s constitutive and enabling role is obscured.28
When John Ruggie highlights “governance gaps created by globalization—
between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the
capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences,” those eco-
nomic forces and actors are, again, implicitly detached from, rather than
rooted in, societies’ governance and legal structures.29  When, more gener-
ally, neoliberal notions “stress[ ] the importance of markets and open econ-
omies for growth and [seek] a more limited role for the state,” as Trubek
describes them, the role of states in constituting and enabling markets and
open economies is implicitly negated.30  The same dynamic is manifest
across the private regulation literature— law’s hand is noted for its role in
constraining MNCs, while its role in creating and enabling MNCs is largely
invisible.31
To understand this dynamic more fully, it is helpful to return to the
work of legal realist scholars who, nearly a century ago, revealed the public
legal underpinnings of private economic power.32  The allegedly private,
free, and voluntary market imagined by laissez-faire ideas, they argued, was
in fact dependent upon coercive state power in the form of property and
contract law, meaning the market was no less “public” than the regulatory
regimes constraining it in aid of public interests.33  As a result, “when the
government intervened in private market relations to curb the use of cer-
tain private bargaining power,” as Barbara Fried describes Robert Hale’s
conclusions, “it did not inject [legal] coercion for the first time into those
relations.  Rather, it merely changed the relative distribution of coercive
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Curtin & Senden, supra note 20, at 168.
28. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 7, at 315.
29. Penelope C. Simons, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corpo-
rate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 5, 11 (2012).
30. David M. Trubek, Law, State, and the New Developmentalism: An Introduction, in
LAW AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICAN
CONTEXT 3, 6 (Helena Alviar Garcia et al. eds., 2013).
31. See, e.g., Cafaggi, New Foundations, supra note 5, at 23.  Private regulation litera-
ture has increasingly viewed law’s potential to constrain MNCs as ineffective. See, e.g.,
id.
32. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927)
[hereinafter Cohen, Property].
33. Id. at 22; Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 562
(1933) [hereinafter Cohen, Contract]; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Sup-
posedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923).
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power.”34  As Hale himself described it, “we live . . . under two govern-
ments, ‘economic’ and ‘political,’ ” yet the former was effectively made
invisible, he said, by laissez-faire’s presumption that economic governance
(the market) is pre-political.35
By corollary, when corporate-constraining laws are rolled back or oth-
erwise weakened, legal coercion is not diminished, but rather redistributed
from, in Hale’s terms, the “political” to the “economic”36— from protecting
public interests to enabling corporations and protecting their interests.37
For example, coercive laws continue (now less constrained by other coer-
cive laws) to:
• Transform groups of individuals into single corporate “persons,” with
obligations and rights (including constitutional rights that serve as
34. BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE
FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 36 (2002).
35. Id. at 36.  The Realists well understood the political effects of restricting concep-
tions of legal coercion to market-constraining regulations.  By excluding market-ena-
bling regulation, such as the laws of property, contract, and corporations from the realm
of coercion, “freedom” was automatically equated with the absence of market-con-
straining regulation.  Within this equation, regulations restricting markets with the aim
of protecting social interests could only be conceived as limiting freedom, but never
promoting it.  The architects of the New Deal, many of whom were influenced by the
Realists, understood the power of this ideological dynamic, and the need to debunk it
when defending their regulatory programs.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act, for example, a
centerpiece of the New Deal’s protection of labor rights, explicitly stated in its preamble
that corporate employers’ power was “developed with the aid of governmental authority
for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership associ-
ation.”  See BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, at 155 for further discussion of this
subject.
36. In other words, public power is “more tightly connected to the interests of corpo-
rations and less so to the public interest,” as stated in BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra
note 25, at 154.
37. See Marc Moore, Is Corporate Law ‘Private’ (and Why Does it Matter)? (2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at SSRN, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2192163), for an excellent account of the public regulatory character
of the law that constitutes corporations, and a critique of attempts to deny that charac-
ter. See also Katharina Pistor, Multinational Corporations as Regulators and Central Plan-
ners: Implications for Citizens’ Voice, in CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP 233– 34 (Greg
Urban ed., 2014).  Pistor explains:
Regulation and central planning are complementary means for advancing the
interests of the MNC’s core operations in a world of multiple legal orders that
create costs while also offering opportunities for new actors able to exploit
them. . . . To a large extent, realizing these opportunities is made possible by
national legal systems.  National legal systems lend enforcement authority to the
contracts by which MNCs enforce regulatory standards.  They endorse private
regulation as “industry practices” or the specification of standards set by
national law.  In addition, they accommodate MNCs in devising specific rules
and regulations in ways that are compatible with the MNCs’ own standards—
whether financial contracts or pollution standards for international transport
and import companies.  Moreover, by protecting the corporate shield they sup-
port MNCs’ central planning strategies, even if they come at the expense of other
stakeholders in markets where foreign subsidiaries operate and their collapse
may create substantial local costs.  Viewed in this light, states are the
handmaidens for the rise of MNCs as regulators and central planners.
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hedges against public regulation38) separate from those of their owners
and officers;
• Limit investors’ liabilities to the amounts they invest, and thus reduce
their exposure to risk, and also enable companies to evade tax and legal
liability through subsidiary schemes;39
• Create and enforce corporations’ contract40 and property41 rights (in
the form of real, commercial, and intellectual property, as well as shares
and other financial instruments);
• Implement new “command and control” policing of anti-corporate
protestors— “heavy police presence, . . . increase[d] police powers[, and]
surveillance of potential protest organizers, with databases of personali-
ties and activities,” as one commentator describes it;42
• Constitute and join international trade liberalization regimes that propel
the very globalization processes that limit states’ capacities to regulate
MNCs in aid of public interests;43
• Require corporate directors and managers to prioritize the “best interests
of the corporation” over all other interests— including social and environ-
mental interests— in all of their decisions and actions.44
Making visible these different ways that law constitutes, enables, and pro-
tects MNCs disaffirms some key presumptions behind private regulation
advocacy.  No longer, for example, can globalization plausibly be pre-
sumed to diminish states’ rule-making authority over MNCs when those
MNCs are dependent on states’ rule-making authority to exist and operate.
No longer can a “governance gap” intelligibly be proposed when govern-
ance continues robustly, albeit in the service of MNCs, rather than in pro-
tecting others from MNCs.  No longer can we imagine “a dearth of (state
and non-state) normativities,” as Muir-Watt describes it, when “despite and
sometimes because of their multiplicity [extant normativities] do not
achieve— and indeed may conspire to impede— the tethering of private
interests in the name of the global good.”45
38. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently further extended constitutional protection
to corporations in relation to political contributions through its decision in Citizens
United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See also Joel Bakan, Psychopaths,
Inc.: On Corporate Personhood, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK 353 (Janet Byrne ed., 2012)
[hereinafter Bakan, Psychopaths].
39. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpora-
tion, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89– 90 (1985).
40. See Cohen, Contract, supra note 33. See also John Fellas, Book Review: The Idea
of Arbitration, by Jan Paulsson, 30 ARB. INT’L 3 (2014), available at http://arbitration.ox
fordjournals.org/content/30/3/589.
41. See Cohen, Property, supra note 32.
42. PETER DAUVERGNE & GENEVIEVE LEBARON, PROTEST INC.: THE CORPORATIZATION OF
ACTIVISM 59 (2014). See also Justin Bachman, A Federal Effort to Reuse Military Gear
Turned Cops Into Commandos, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.bloom
berg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-14/ferguson-shooting-how-military-gear-ended-up-with-
local-police.
43. Simons, supra note 29, at 27.
44. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) for an
example of a judicial articulation of this standard.
45. Muir-Watt, supra note 7, at 407.  Per Muir-Watt, id. at 358:
What appears deeply problematic, therefore, is not that regulation is unavaila-
ble, nor indeed that it flows from sources beyond the sovereign state, but that
whatever rules there are, these rules appear to lack a transcendent horizon of the
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Particularly challenging for arguments favoring private regulation is
the legal imperative that corporate directors and managers prioritize the
“best interests of the corporation”— the last entry on the list above.  Perhaps
most directly, this norm reveals how mandatory law’s presence, and not
only its absence, fuels corporate exploitation and harm.  A long-standing
debate within corporate law scholarship (and, to some extent, corporate
law itself) asks whether the “best interests” of corporations are limited to
shareholder value, or whether they also include social responsibilities.46
Typical is the classic Dodd-Berle exchange, where Merrick Dodd argued
that the corporation is “an economic institution which has a social service
as well as a profit-making function,” while Adolfe Berle claimed that “all
powers granted to a corporation or to the management of the corporation
[are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of the sharehold-
ers.”47  Though Dodd’s argument was, and remains, conceptually compel-
ling, and continues to resonate with many scholars,48 Berle’s shareholder
value approach prevailed in practice and continues to dominate corporate
law today.  Even Lynn Stout, for example, a leading critic of the approach
who argues it is illogical, harmful, and corrosive of the very purposes of
corporate law, concedes it is “well accepted” in practice, and that “direc-
tors, executives, and employees in corporations . . . reasonably assume . . .
the law requires them to maximize shareholder value.”49
The status of shareholder value as the governing legal norm for corpo-
rate decision-making and practice means, in effect, that MNCs are com-
pelled by state law to prioritize shareholder value in the form of profit,
performance, and growth, and, by corollary, are prohibited from pursuing
social and environmental values as ends in themselves.50  MNCs are, in
short, controlled and commanded by law to limit their pursuit of social and
environmental values unless such pursuit can somehow be aligned with
their own financial interests.51  Law— its “formal rules and stipulations,
adversarial methods, enforceable means of dispute resolution, and com-
mand-and-control regulatory mechanisms,” as Shamir describes it52— is the
source of these limitations and, more generally, of the dangerously self-
interested tendencies of corporations.53  However, none of that can be seen
global good, and any sense of connectedness in terms of causal linkages and
systemic risks.  However much formal and informal law exists, it does little to
rein in private interests.
46. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 17 (2012).
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 4, 25.
50. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
51. See generally Dodge, 170 N.W.
52. Shamir, Capitalism, Governance, and Authority, supra note 2, at 534.
53. Admittedly, this legal framework can be pushed against, and imaginatively
worked within, by socially-minded corporate officers and employees.  Convergence
among social and environmental interests and corporate interests can be found, as
“shared value” prescribes, making it possible for corporations to obey the legal impera-
tive to prioritize their and their owners’ interests, while, at the same time, pursuing
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or questioned, when, as is the case in much private regulation discourse,
law’s constitutive, enabling, and protective role for MNCs is invisible.
III. Private Regulation and the Rule of Law
In Whigs and Hunters, historian E.P. Thompson describes a hideous
episode in law’s long history of enforcing class power.54  England’s eight-
eenth century Black Act punished with death suspected poachers on aristo-
crats’ lands, demonstrating, as Thompson elaborates, how brutally unjust
law can be.55  Yet, Thompson observes, law can also be just and virtuous, a
possibility immanent in our very belief that the Black Act is brutally unjust:
“If I judge the Black Act to be atrocious,” he says, “this is . . . according to
some ideal notion of the standards to which the ‘law,’ as a regulator of
human conflicts of interest . . . must always seek to transcend the inequali-
ties of class power which, instrumentally, it is harnessed to serve.”56  His-
tory is replete with laws, like the Black Act, that unjustly magnify the power
of the powerful and cause pain, horror, and dispossession for others.57
Racial apartheid and segregation, colonialism, genocide, discrimination of
all sorts, patriarchy, human rights and labor abuses— all have been articu-
lated, justified, and executed through law.58  Yet, history also reveals that
law can, and sometimes does, fulfill Thompson’s “ideal notion,” standing
up to injustice, including the very injustices it creates.59
Public regulation, in the form of legal regimes designed to protect pub-
lic interests from harm at the hands of economic actors, is exemplary of
Thompson’s “ideal notion” of law.  It was in the name of that “ideal
notion,” for example, that President Franklin Roosevelt promulgated his
New Deal: a sweeping legal intervention in aid of public interests.  “[W]e
were not to be content with merely hoping for . . . [constitutional] ideals,”
he stated at the time, but “were to use the instrumentalities and powers of
Government to actively fight for them . . . [and] against the misuse of pri-
vate economic power.”60  More recently, in similar spirit, Robin West
observes that “in the presence of [regulatory] law, the capitalist relin-
social initiatives.  Those initiatives will be necessarily narrow, however, as described
above, and the reason for that narrowing is that mandatory state law demands such
initiatives further corporate as well as social objectives. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. v. Bar-
low, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)
54. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 267– 68 (1977).
55. See id. at 268.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 266.
58. See, e.g., Jean Cohen, supra note 2.
59. See THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 269.  As an ideal and aspiration, then, if not
always in practice, the rule of law is arguably an “unqualified [human] good.” See id. at
267.  Cohen captures a similar notion in what she describes as the “Janus face of law”:
“we must be aware that juridification can entail the authorization of new power hierar-
chies as well as normatively desirable constructions and limits of public power.”  Jean
Cohen, supra note 2, at 7.
60. THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, VOLUME TWO: THE
YEAR OF CRISIS, 1933 5 (Samuel Rosenman ed., 1938), as cited in BAKAN, THE CORPORA-
TION, supra note 25 (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 57– 58 (1993)).
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quishes some economic power he or it possesses in law’s absence, and the
hierarchy created through wealth is regulated,” thereby demonstrating that
shared subjection to the sovereignty of law “displaces cruel and brutal
realms of private sovereignty, and thereby serves egalitarian ends.”61
Public regulation can thus be understood as animated and justified by
“ideal notions” akin to those Thompson describes, even while its actual
record falls notoriously short of those ideals (due in part to relentless
industry pressure on governments before, during, and since the time of the
New Deal62).  Indeed, by the early 1980s, the very idea (and ideal) of pub-
lic regulation as a means for protecting public interests was under attack,
and with the ensuing rise of neoliberalism, cynicism and suspicion quickly
set in.63  Today, the inadequacies of public regulatory regimes are legion
and notorious— agency capture, revolving doors (between industry and
agencies), undue corporate influence through lobbying and electoral cam-
paign financing, pork barreling and earmarking, corruption, underfunded
and inadequate enforcement, and, of course, the pressures of globaliza-
tion— and contribute to a growing chasm between the ideals of public regu-
lation, and the actual operations of public regulatory systems.64
As a result, many today— private regulation advocates chief among
them— believe public regulation is a lost cause and that its hierarchical,
legal, and sovereignty-based control of MNCs should give way to heter-
oarchical, voluntary, and private norms.65  New forms of global govern-
61. ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL
EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 173, 175 (2003).  In a similar vein, West notes
“the potential of law . . . to serve as a challenge to the preferences and desires that are
otherwise reflected in, and gratified in, various exchange markets, and to do so . . .
toward the end . . . of enhancing human wellbeing.” Id. at 174. Importantly, however,
while ‘public regulation’ connotes mandatory legal regimes (ones composed of rules,
principles, and standards promulgated and enforced by sovereign state institutions and
recognized as binding within their jurisdictions), that does not limit it to strictly com-
mand-and-control regimes.  There is a large and live debate about new modes of regula-
tion that maintain a mandatory legal character— thus being neither private nor
voluntary— while taking a non-command-and-control form. See, e.g., discussions of “co-
regulation” in BAKAN, CHILDHOOD UNDER SIEGE, supra note 1, at 60, 64– 65, 259; “princi-
ple-based regulation” in Paul Latimer and Phillip Maume, PROMOTING INFORMATION IN
THE MARKET FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES: FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS 217– 234 (2015); and “responsive regulation” in Christine Parker, Twenty
Years of Responsive Regulation: An Appreciation and Appraisal, 7 REG. AND GOVERNANCE 2
(2013).
62. See BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 25 at 86.
63. See id. at 21.
64. See, e.g., id. at 162.
65. See generally Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of
Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y. 1 (2011).  One can challenge this
view— as I do— while still acknowledging that 1) states have lost some control over their
territories, borders, populations, and institutions (including corporations), especially as
international organizations morph into global governors and regulators; 2) technological
innovation fuels economic interdependence; 3) major corporations operate in multiple
nations; and 3) environmental degradation, migration, human rights, and terrorism defy
(and deny) state borders (see Jean Cohen, supra note 2). These factors may present chal-
lenges for mandatory legal regulation, but not reasons to abandon the project in favor of
private alternatives.
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ance require, they believe, “rethinking . . . the public-private divide,” taking
“some caution against the risks of excessive legalization,” and prioritizing
the search for “alternatives to legal control.”66  Dethrone the rule of law as
the governing norm for regulating MNCs (relegating it to some uncertain
stature), they proclaim, and “rethink[ ] constitutional theory” to find new
bases for legitimating regimes that exist outside the normal channels of
legality and democratic accountability.67
Such prescriptions unmistakably diminish law to a lesser— and in
some cases negligible— role in policing MNCs.68  Law’s potential to fetter
power in the name of justice, Thompson’s “ideal notion,” is abandoned in
favor of faith in MNCs voluntarily to wield power justly.69  Law’s power to
“displace[ ] cruel and brutal realms of private sovereignty,” as West
describes it,70 is replaced with trust that MNCs will be less “cruel and bru-
tal.”  Law’s promise to “transcend the inequalities of class power which,
instrumentally, it is harnessed to serve,” as Thompson describes it,71 is
betrayed by shifting regulatory power to institutional repositories of class
power (MNCs).  Finally, law’s power to protect public interests from MNCs,
and therefore to work “against the misuse of private economic power,” as
Roosevelt describes it,72 is weakened in ways that enhance private eco-
nomic power.73
66. Scott, supra note 65, at 16.
67. Id. at 15– 16.
68. At the same time this diminishes democracy, in light of the intrinsic link
between the rule of law and democracy (at least within democratic orders). See BAKAN,
THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, at 139. See also infra note 73.
69. See THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 268.
70. See WEST, supra note 61, at 175.
71. See THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 268.
72. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 57– 58; Rosenman, supra note 60, at 5.
73. This undermines not only the rule of law, but principles of democratic govern-
ance as well.  Shifting regulatory authority from public to private authorities results in a
kind of “dedemocratization, as it denies ‘the people’, acting through their representatives
in government, the only official political vehicle they currently have to control corporate
behavior.” See BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, at 150.  Private regulation advo-
cates acknowledge this “democratic deficit,” and recognize that it raises legitimacy
issues.  Various solutions are offered.  Some suggest “reconceptualiz[ing] the bases of
legitimacy for [private regulation] regimes” and recognizing that private regulation “may
constitute a new form of global democratic governance” where democratic potential lies
with plural private actors (MNCs, NGOs, and civil society groups) combining to govern
the behavior of MNCs. See Scott, supra note 65, at 14– 15.  Others find democratic
potential within markets.  Investors and consumers, they say, informed by media, NGOs,
and internet savvy civil society groups, can choose to buy, and to buy from, companies
that pursue social and environmental values, while boycotting those that do not, and
thus express their democratic preferences. See, e.g., Ruth V. Aguilera, Deborah E. Rupp,
Cynthia A. Williams & Jyoti Ganapathi, Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsi-
bility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836
(2007).  These approaches, whether relying on NGOs, civil society groups, or consumer
and investor markets, effectively dispense with the need for governance by public institu-
tions with formal lines of democratic accountability to citizens.  Instead they offer vague
and unrealistic presumptions about the potential and likelihood of private institutions
and actors coming together to govern in ways that manifest the fundamentally public
values that lie at the heart of any meaningful conception of democracy. See also BAKAN,
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Advocates of private regulation defend law’s displacement by arguing
that private voluntary norms can be at least as effective as mandatory legal
norms in curbing “misuse of private economic power.”74  Key to that argu-
ment is the presumption that MNCs can do what private regulation
prescribes for them— voluntarily promulgate and abide by meaningful
social and environmental standards.  For that presumption, and therefore
private regulation itself, to be plausible, however, corporations must be
understood as able to transcend narrow self-interest and to embrace mean-
ingful social and environmental commitments.  “Construction of a ‘corpo-
rate conscience’” is necessary, as Ronan Shamir observes, for “securing a
rationale for private and self-regulation.”75
Construction of that conscience has been underway in the form of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) since the 1980s, when private regula-
tion first emerged.76  Today, CSR is mainstream, a mantra for business
leaders, a ubiquitous presence in marketing and public relations cam-
paigns, and an organizing principle for earnest gatherings of NGOs, schol-
ars, business leaders, and government officials.77  All large companies, and
most small ones, maintain well-publicized CSR plans, publish glossy CSR
reports and websites, and staff CSR offices and vice-presidencies.78  A bur-
geoning CSR industry provides infrastructural support, consulting ser-
vices, and monitoring programs, while business schools feature CSR
professorships, and offer CSR courses and degree programs.79
CSR undoubtedly lends putative support to claims that private regula-
tion can replace or substantially supplement mandatory legal norms.
When MNCs are understood as able and likely to consider social and envi-
ronmental values in decisions and actions, it seems reasonable to believe
that they can “assume the self-discipline that governments had required of
them in the past,” as Samir Gibara, former chair and CEO of Goodyear Tire
describes it,80 and thereby play the roles private regulation regimes
demand of them.  Reconceiving MNCs as socially responsible is therefore
necessary for private regulation to be a plausible alternative to mandatory
legal regulation.  The evidence suggests, however, that it is not sufficient.
THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, at c.6 (developing the argument against relying upon
private orders to deliver democratic governance).
74. See Rosenman, supra note 60, at 5; Shamir, Capitalism, Governance and Author-
ity, supra note 2, at 536.
75. See Shamir, Capitalism, Governance and Authority, supra note 2, at 536.
76. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HAR. BUS. REV. 1, 6 (Dec.
2006).
77. See, e.g., Simon Zadek, Best Practice: The Path to Corporate Responsibility, HAR.
BUS. REV. 1, 39 (Dec. 2006).
78. See Porter & Kramer, supra note 76, at 5; Clive Crook, The Good Company: A
Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 1– 2.
79. See BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, at 16-59; Shamir, Socially Responsi-
ble Private Regulation, supra note 4, at 313, 324, 328; Tim Bartley, Institutional Emer-
gence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and
Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297, 301 (2007); Crook, The Good Company,
supra note 78, at 1– 2.
80. See BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, at 27.
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IV. The Limits of Private Regulation
The rise of CSR neither challenged nor changed the corporation’s legal
core, which still features the “best interest of the corporation” principle,
and its requirement that managers and directors prioritize shareholder
value.81  The constraints imposed by the principle on corporations’ pursuit
of social and environmental values are indeed accepted by most CSR advo-
cates, who ask companies to find synergies between business interests and
other values, but not to sacrifice the former to the latter.  “The essential test
that should guide CSR is not whether a cause is worthy,” as Porter and
Kramer state, “but whether it presents an opportunity to create shared
value— that is, a meaningful benefit for society that is also valuable to the
business.”82  A corporation’s CSR agenda should seek opportunities to
“achieve social and economic benefits simultaneously,” to “reinforce corpo-
rate strategy by advancing social conditions,” and to “make the most signif-
icant social impact and reap the greatest business benefits.”83
Contemporary CSR is largely defined and inspired by Porter and
Kramers’ “shared value” approach,84 which its advocates distinguish from
earlier, narrowly strategic CSR— “hypocritical window dressing,” as Milton
Friedman once described it.85  Though the latter may still define much
corporate practice,86 they say, the tide is turning.  “Defensive, minimalist
responses to social and environmental issues will be replaced by proactive
strategies and investment in growing responsibility markets,” according to
Wayne Visser, who describes the new approach as CSR 2.0.87  “Reputation-
conscious public-relations approaches to CSR will no longer be credible
81. For an exploration of these limits, see id.
82. See Porter & Kramer, supra note 76, at 12 (2006) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 16.
84. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPO-
RATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 19– 21 (2005) for examples of the business case for CSR (“the
typical business book on CSR consists either of examples of companies that have
behaved more responsibly and thus have also been financially successful, or advises
managers how to make their firms both responsible and profitable.  Many of their titles
and dust jackets tout the responsibility-profitability connection.”). See also THE BUSINESS
OF SUSTAINABILITY: BUILDING INDUSTRY CASES FOR SUSTAINABILITY (Ulrich Steger ed., 2004);
Tom Casten, Pro-Profit, Pro-Planet: How Adam Smith Can Help Us Solve the Climate Crisis,
RECYCLED ENERGY DEV. (April 2010); Monbiot, supra note 20, at 428– 29.  The philosophy
underlying “shared value” and business-case CSR was first broadly articulated in PAUL
HAWKEN, AMORY B. LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS, NATURAL CAPITAL: THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION (1999).
85. See BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, at 25– 59; Milton Friedman, The
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970),
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-busi
ness.html.
86. “Many CSR efforts are little more than PR campaigns designed to promote corpo-
rate brands— by creating the appearance of being ‘good corporate citizens,’” as a Harvard
Business Review editorial states.  “Result?  CSR investments that deepen public cynicism
and fail to generate real social change.” Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility, On
Point Collection, HAR. BUS. REV. 1, 1 (Dec. 2006).  See also BAKAN, THE CORPORATION,
supra note 25, at 28-59 and Bakan, Psychopaths, supra note 38, for examples of CSR as
“hypocritical window dressing.”
87. WAYNE VISSER, THE AGE OF RESPONSIBILITY: CSR 2.0 AND THE NEW DNA OF BUSI-
NESS 147 (2011).
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and so companies will be judged on actual social, environmental and ethi-
cal performance.  . . . [E]ach dimension of CSR 2.0 performance will be
embedded and integrated into the core operations of companies.”88
Major MNCs are now embracing such ideas and have been over the
last decade, expanding their mandates and missions to include “creating
shared value, not just profit per se,” as Porter and Kramer describe it,89 by
integrating new obligations into core operations, and assuming leadership
roles in solving social and environmental problems.  In that spirit, CEOs
from fourteen major MNCs, including Nike, Microsoft, and Coca-Cola,
jointly declared at the 2008 Davos World Economic Forum that corpora-
tions are at a “new frontier in corporate global citizenship and a new era in
public-private partnership,”90 now responsible not only for governing
themselves, but also for “building better governance systems and public
institutions” for society as a whole.91  Implicit in this declaration is the
new corporate ethos manifest in new approaches to CSR, whereby corpora-
tions appear as advocates for social and environmental values rather than
threats to them, leaders in the search for solutions to global problems
rather than contributors to them, and partners with governments rather
than subordinates to them.92
88. Id.
89. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism
and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV. 62, 64 (Jan./Feb., 2011).
90. Press Release, Business for Social Responsibility, BSR News from Davos: Busi-
nesses Urged to Take Part in Greater Public-Private Cooperation to Strengthen Global
Governance (Jan. 25, 2008, 9:15 AM), available at http://www.csrwire.com/press_
releases/22401-BSR-News-from-Davos-Businesses-Urged-to-Take-Part-in-Greater-Public-
Private-Cooperation-to-Strengthen-Global-Governance.
91. Id.
92. Companies commonly boast today of social leadership roles that go beyond
traditional CSR commitments to avoid causing harm.  At Nikeinc.com, for example, one
clickable button, labeled “Sustainable Business Performance Summary,” leads to mate-
rial reflecting those traditional commitments, while a second, “Nike Better World,”
accesses material that highlights Nike’s efforts and leadership on broader social issues
(through, for example, a program that funds a children’s hospital with proceeds from
shoes designed by patients, and another that brings “sport and all of its benefits to
Native American and Aboriginal communities in North America”). See Sustainability,
NIKE, http://nikeinc.com/pages/responsibility (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).  In similar
spirit, Microsoft makes the traditional CSR promise to “minimize the environmental
impact of our business operations and products,” while also undertaking to “create tech-
nology solutions that help individuals and businesses around the world address their
environmental impact.” See Corporate Citizenship, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.
com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/working-responsibly/principled-business-prac
tices/environmental-sustainability/ (last visited April 25, 2015).  Coca-Cola partners
with Oxfam and the World Wildlife Fund to “protect the land rights of farmers and
communities in the world’s top sugarcane-producing regions, advancing its ongoing
efforts to drive transparency and accountability across its global supply chain,” while
also promoting social and environmental causes beyond its operations and supply
chains, such as protecting polar bears, helping typhoon victims, and curbing alcohol
impaired driving. See, e.g., 2013/2014 Coca-Cola Sustainability Report, COCA-COLA,
http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/#TCCC (last visited April 25, 2015); Sourc-
ing Sustainability: Coke Takes Leadership Role to Protect Land Rights of Farmers and Com-
munities, COCA-COLA (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/
sourcing-sustainably-coke-takes-leadership-role-to-protect-land-rights-of-farmers-and-
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There are good reasons to be skeptical,93 however, especially when, as
already noted, new approaches to CSR demand only that corporations
share value with social and environmental concerns, but not sacrifice it to
those concerns.  As such, while the new CSR undoubtedly inspires broader
social and environmental initiatives from MNCs, its demand that corpora-
tions pursue social and environmental good only when it helps them do
well— that CSR initiatives necessarily “intersect with [an MNC’s] particular
business,” as Porter and Kramer describe it94— profoundly narrows
possibilities.
Take, for example, Shell Oil, which recently signed the Trillion Tonne
Communique, the self-proclaimed “progressive business voice” on climate
change.95  On first glance, Shell, currently involved in some of the world’s
most controversial fossil fuel development and exploration, seems a sur-
prising party to the Communique, not least because it is the only major oil
company to sign on.96  Shell— a sixty percent partner in the Athabasca Oil
Sands Project,97 major backer of the Keystone Pipeline,98 and heavily
involved across the globe in hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”)99— is regu-
larly targeted by protestors,100 environmental and climate change advo-
communities; Coke Raises More than $2 Million to Save Polar Bears, COCA-COLA, http://
www.coca-colacompany.com/our-company/coke-raises-over-2-million-to-save-polar-
bears (last visited April 25, 2015).
93. The “rhetoric of governments ‘partnering’ with industry continues to resonate,”
as Lorne Sossin has observed, though, as he states, there are good reasons to be skepti-
cal (and many are) “of the idea that we can better manage risk by empowering industry
to watch over itself.” See Lorne Sossin, Runaway Train: Assessing Risk in the Aftermath of
Lac-Me´gantic, THE WALRUS (July/Aug., 2014), http://thewalrus.ca/runaway-train/.  For
further discussion of government-corporate partnerships, see generally BAKAN, THE COR-
PORATION, supra note 25.
94. Porter & Kramer, supra note 76, at 11.
95. The Prince of Wales Corporate Leaders Group, The Corporate Climate Communi-
que´s, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP (2014), available
at http://www.climatecommuniques.com/ (last visited April 25, 2015); The Prince of
Wales Corporate Leaders Group, Trillion Tonne Communique´: Frequently Asked Questions,
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP 1 (April 2014), http://
www.climatecommuniques.com/~/media/Files/Communique%202014/The_Trillion_
Tonne_Communique_FAQ.pdf.
96. See id. at Who’s Signed?, available at http://www.climatecommuniques.com/
Whos-Signed/View-All.aspx (last visited April 25, 2015).
97. SHELL OIL, OIL SANDS PERFORMANCE REPORT 2013 1, 14 (2013), http://s00.static-
shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/can/downloads/pdf/oil-sands/oil-
sands-performance-report-2013.pdf.
98. See Christine Dobby, Economic benefits will likely win Keystone XL approval: Shell,
THE FIN. POST (Oct. 24, 2011), http://business.financialpost.com/news/energy/econo
mic-benefits-will-likely-win-keystone-xl-approval-shell?__lsa=73a5-0352.
99. Tom Bawden, Shell sets its sights on a leading role in fracking, THE INDEPENDENT
(Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/shell-sets-its-
sights-on-a-leading-role-in-fracking-8476222.html.
100. See, e.g., Phuong Le, Shell Oil Plan in Seattle Draws Protestors, THE COLUMBIAN
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.columbian.com/news/2015/jan/28/shell-oil-plan-in-seattle-
draws-protesters/; Nigeria: Shell Workers ‘Blocked’ by Protestors, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Apr.
3, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17600042.
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cates,101 and ambitious regulators.102  “We’re very conscious,” states
Marvin Odum, president of Shell Oil in the United States, “of the fact the
world is likely moving to a place of regulating carbon in some respect.”103
Joining that movement, rather than opposing it, and working to ensure
it yields favorable results for the company, has been key for Shell and helps
explain why it signed the Communique.  “What’s important to us, and
what our primary push has been with governments,” says Odum, “is ensur-
ing . . . that [regulations are] market-based systems to allow carbon regula-
tion to happen at the lowest possible cost.”104  Cap-and-trade is the
preferred approach, he says, “one of the clearest examples of a market-
based system.”105  Carbon capture and storage is another option, says
Odum, “a great example of efforts to reduce carbon emissions from oil
sands.”106  The ultimate goal, says Odum, is to find the “right policy frame-
work— like a price on carbon— that companies could do on their own.”107
Shell’s preference for voluntary market-based regulation is well-served
by the Communique which, in line with “shared value” CSR, articulates a
“pro-business” position, presumes climate change solutions “can and
should be delivered in ways that create new business opportunities, and
keep costs manageable,” and prescribes “policies that work with the mar-
ket to incentivize the private sector.”108  These proposed solutions— which
explicitly include Odum’s preferred approaches of carbon pricing, capture,
and storage109— should, the Communique states, “lead to economic bene-
fits, while insulating the global economy from risks caused by a planet that
warms beyond two degrees.”110
Shell really has nothing to fear from the Communique and indeed
much to gain by supporting it.  Not only does the Communique endorse
market-driven regulatory solutions, including the very ones Shell advo-
cates, but it also helps “shap[e] the narrative” on business and climate
change— as the Communique describes one of its goals111— in favor of
those solutions, while simultaneously signaling to consumers and govern-
ments that the company cares and is doing something about climate
101. See Phuong Le supra note 100; Anastasia Killian, Environmental Groups Continue
Attempts to Thwart Arctic Oil Exploration, FORBES (June 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.
com/fdc/welcome_mjx.shtml.
102. See, e.g., Hal Bernton, Shell’s Plan to Increase Oil Trains in Anacortes Hits Snag,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/shells-plan-to-
increase-oil-trains-in-anacortes-hits-snag/; Ben Geman, Inside Big Oil’s Fight over Arctic
Drilling Rules, NAT’L J. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/inside-
big-oil-s-fight-over-arctic-drilling-rules-20140924.
103. James Cowan, Why Keystone XL Will Be Approved: One-on-one with Shell Oil Presi-
dent Marvin Odum, CANADIAN BUS. (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.canadianbusiness.com/
economy/good-news-for-canadian-oil/.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. See also SHELL OIL, supra note 97.
107. Cowan, supra note 103.
108. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 95, at 5.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id. at 2– 3.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-2\CIN201.txt unknown Seq: 18 23-SEP-15 8:24
296 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 48
change.  Most importantly, by signing the Communique, Shell endorses an
initiative, putatively “progressive,” that implicitly de-legitimates the use of
mandatory legal restrictions to combat climate change, including restric-
tions that could curb Shell’s continued oil sand development, frustrate
hydraulic fracturing, and bar construction of new pipelines.
Shell’s endorsement of the Communique is typical of “shared value”
CSR; the company’s core business strategies remain in place, while its repu-
tation is boosted and its “best interests” promoted, or at least not curtailed.
Similar dynamics can be found across companies and industries.112  Coca-
Cola, for example, uses renewable and recyclable plant-based plastics to
make its bottles,113 while Starbucks’ Ethos Water contributes pennies for
each bottle sold to help raise awareness about the fact that “more than 1
billion people on our planet can’t get clean water to drink.”114  Yet neither
company is likely to embrace the broadly held view that “bottled water
represents the very antithesis of what sustainability means,” as Luke
Upchurch of Consumers International describes it,115 and thereby to cease
production of bottled water altogether.
Similarly, British American Tobacco produces purportedly reduced-
risk products and promotes biodiversity around tobacco fields, “creat[ing]
shared value for [its] shareholders and society,” as CEO Nicandro Durante
states,116 and thus claims to be socially responsible.  Yet for the World
Health Organization (WHO), and many others, the tobacco industry’s bus-
iness model is itself socially irresponsible— an “inherent contradic-
tion”117— not in the least because of companies’ calculated strategies to
“subvert,” in WHO’s words, “the role of governments and of WHO in
implementing public health policies to combat the tobacco epidemic.”118
112. See PETER DAUVERGNE & JANE LISTER, ECO-BUSINESS: A BIG-BRAND TAKEOVER OF
SUSTAINABILITY (2013) (describing the efforts of leading international corporations to
employ sustainability as a business tool).
113. PlantBottle Technology™ Tops 2014 Sustainable Bio Awards, COCA-COLA, http://
www.coca-colacompany.com/coca-cola-unbottled/coca-cola-first-consumer-brand-com
pany-to-win-industry-champion-award (last visited April 25, 2015).
114. Ethos® Water Fund, STARBUCKS, www.starbucks.com/responsibility/community/
ethos-water-fund (last visited April 25, 2015).
115. Luke Upchurch, Can Bottled Water Ever Really Be Sustainable?, THE GUARDIAN
(June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/can-bottled-water-be-
sustainable.
116. British American Tobacco, Sustainability Summary, Sustainability: Why It Mat-
ters 1, 2 (2012), http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk__9d9kcy.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/
DO9DCL3P/$FILE/medMD95XPJA.pdf?openelement.
117. World Health Organization, Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 3d Sess, FCTC/COP3(7) 1, 7 (Nov.
2008), http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/adopted/article_5_3/en/.  Article 27 of the
Guidelines states: “The corporate social responsibility of the tobacco industry is, accord-
ing to WHO, an inherent contradiction, as industry’s core functions are in conflict with
the goals of public health policies with respect to tobacco control.”  On that basis, the
document explicitly recommends against private regulation.  Article 21(3.3) states: “Par-
ties should not accept, support or endorse any voluntary code of conduct or instrument
drafted by the tobacco industry that is offered as a substitute for legally enforceable
tobacco control measures.”
118. Id. at 1.
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These examples (and there are many others that might be added) show
how CSR, even in its newly broadened ideations, remains limited and prob-
lematic: one step forward, perhaps, for its providing some protection of
social and environmental values, but three steps back for molding regula-
tory debates to prioritize business interests, helping justify governments’
retreat from mandatory norms, and promoting narratives of corporate
change to pacify potential critics.119  It would, of course, be different if
there were broad convergence among business, social, and environmental
interests.  In reality, however, the social and environmental initiatives that
plausibly converge with business interests constitute a “very narrow subset
that involve little cost, little risk, and little disruption to business as usual,”
as Charles Eisenstein describes it.120  That is the conclusion not only of
commentators,121 but also many CEOs who report feeling caught in cycles
of “individual, small-scale projects, programs and business units with an
incremental impact on sustainability metrics,” while “their responsibilities
to more traditional fundamentals of business success, and to the expecta-
tions of markets and stakeholders, are preventing greater scale, speed and
impact.”122  Sustainability cannot be achieved, these CEOs believe, “with-
out radical, structural change to markets and systems.”123
The limits of  “shared value” CSR, and, by implication, private regula-
tion, are profound, which is likely the reason “no significant move has been
made [through private regulation] . . . to tame multinational corporate mis-
conduct in respect of [major global issues].”124  When social and environ-
119. Stacey Mitchell similarly describes Walmart’s sustainability programs as “one
step forward and three steps back” as quoted in Dauvergne & Lister, supra, note 112, at
23.  Dauvergne & Lister add that “the big brand takeover of sustainability is shifting the
purpose and goal of sustainability governance toward the need to create business value.”
Id. at 25.
120. Charles Eisenstein, Let’s Be Honest: Real Sustainability May Not Make Business
Sense, THE GUARDIAN,  Sustainable Business Blog (Jan. 8, 2014, 09:33 AM), http://www.
theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/sustainability-business-sense-profit-pur
pose.
121. See, e.g., Megan Bowman, The Limitations of Business Case Logic for Societal Bene-
fit & Implications for Corporate Law: A case study of climate friendly banks (2014),
presented at 2014 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (CELS), Univ. of Cal. at Berke-
ley, November 6-8, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2489116; Andrew Hoffman, Climate Change Strategy: The Business Logic Behind Vol-
untary Greenhouse Gas Reductions, 47 CAL. MGMT. REV. 21, 23 (2005); Markus J. Milne,
Helen Tregidga and Sara Walton, Words Not Actions! The Ideological Role of Sustainable
Development Reporting, 22 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 1211, 1241 (2009);
Crawford Spence, Social and Environmental Reporting and Hegemonic Discourse, 20
ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 855, 875 (2007).
122. United Nations Global Compact, Accenture CEO Study on Sustainability 2013:
Architects of a Better World 1, 11 (2013), http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocu
ments/PDF/Accenture-UN-Global-Compact-Acn-CEO-Study-Sustainability-2013.pdf.
123. Id. at 5.  Despite these survey results, the idea that business rather than govern-
ment should take the lead in solving social and environmental problems continues to
have much resonance among business leaders and commentators.  See, e.g., Marc Gun-
ther, Corporate Executives Gather at U.N. for a Go at Fixing Sustainability, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov 21, 2014),  www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/nov/21/future-cor
poration-united-nations-regulation-government.
124. Muir-Watt, supra note 7, at 382.
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mental interests depend for their protection on measures that must cohere
with business interests, the “severe hardship, injustice, imbalance and cri-
sis linked to the rise of private global rulers”125 are likely to go largely
unchecked.  Even Porter and Kramer acknowledge that “social agendas” do
not always align with corporate and industry interests, and that in many
instances, “NGOs or government institutions . . . are [thereby] better posi-
tioned to address them.”126  Yet they, along with many other CSR and pri-
vate regulation advocates, continue to promote the notion that
corporations— “the most powerful force for addressing the pressing issues
we face”127— should take the lead on social and environmental issues,
while governments retreat to positions as “rule takers” from their tradi-
tional roles as “rule makers.”128
Conclusion
It has been more than thirty years since Dean Paul Carrington chas-
tised critical legal studies scholars for “profess[ing] that legal principle
does not matter,” calling on them to resign their law school posts.129  His
portrayal of critical legal studies was a caricature and his prescriptions
shrill,130 but his central claim that legality must be defended against nihil-
ism bears repeating as private regulation proponents “profess that legal
principle does not matter,” or matters less, for constraining MNCs in aid of
public interests.131  “The time is ripe,” Galit Sarfaty observes, to reassert
the need “for corporate accountability through mandatory regulations,”
especially as we slide into broad acceptance of non-legal regulation in lieu
of law.132  Though voluntary commitments may help companies “deflect[ ]
state regulation and express[ ] their good ‘corporate citizenship,’” the
“need for binding regulation” remains.133
There is also, however, a need to consider the “binding regulations”
already in place that serve to constitute corporations, enable their opera-
tions, and protect their interests.  As Part II reveals, these tend to be down-
played by private regulation advocates and commentators who, as a result,
make exaggerated claims about globalization’s diminishment of state legal
authority.134  Corporations, as this Article argues, are legal constructs, cre-
ated only through the operation of state law.  They are rooted within and
125. Id. at 406.
126. Porter & Kramer, supra note 76, at 64.
127. Id.
128. See Cafaggi & Renda, Labyrinth, supra note 3, at 21.
129. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1994).
130. See Gary Minda, Of Law, the River and Legal Education 10 NOVA L. REV. 705, 705
(1985– 1986); Nihilism and Academic Freedom: Introduction and Correspondence, 35 J. OF
LEGAL EDUC. 180 (1985).
131. See Carrington, supra note 129, at 227.
132. See Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L.
97, 115– 16 (2013).
133. See id.
134. See generally Part II, supra. See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 7; Cafaggi &
Renda, Labyrinth, supra note 3.
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operate through domestic legal systems, tethered to and manifesting state
sovereignty in every decision and action they take.  There is no “regulatory
gap,” no corporate space transcending state sovereignty, but only multiple
corporate nationals operating in multiple nations— multinational corpora-
tions, but never truly transnational ones.135
It follows that when corporations adversely affect social and environ-
mental interests, it is because they are enabled, incentivized, and licensed to
do so by mandatory state law.  By corollary, law can disable, dis-incen-
tivize, and limit that license, which is why, despite the alleged ravages of
globalization, there are, as Patrick Macklem observes,  “multiple opportuni-
ties for holding corporations domestically accountable.”136  States can, for
example, assert jurisdiction over local companies operating in other
nations;137 revoke their charters;138 refuse to limit their liability in relation
to foreign subsidiaries;139 condition access to markets on compliance with
domestic standards;140 and participate in international regimes that
demand promulgation and enforcement of domestic standards, thus
deploying public international law to, in Macklem’s words, “rebuild . . . the
state’s capacity to regulate, in the name of [social interests], multinational
corporate power.”141
Rebuilding that capacity is neither simple nor easy.  In the developed
world, political inertia and corporate influence work against states, creat-
ing robust extra-territorial jurisdictions over the corporations they create
and enable (as the fate of the Alien Torts Act, a law with some potential in
that regard, illustrates).142  In the developing world, and often the devel-
oped world too, regulatory laws and regimes can be poorly conceived,
under-enforced, corrupted, and unduly influenced by industry.143  As in
every other area of human endeavor, a gap exists here between actual prac-
tice and ideal possibility.  Building effective public and democratic govern-
ance of the global economy is what is needed to narrow that gap, a project
requiring much work both domestically and internationally.
135. I am indebted to Gerardo Otero for this insight, as related to me in conversation.
136. See Macklem, supra note 22 at 281.
137. See generally Joel P. Tractman, International Regulatory Competition, Externaliza-
tion, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47 (1993).
138. See, e.g., BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, at 157– 8.
139. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L.
REV. 80, 80, 85– 89 (1991).
140. See Macklem, supra note 22, at 289.
141. Id.  It is difficult to see opportunities to rebuild domestic and democratic regula-
tion if we accept the conceits of “transnationalism.” See Gerardo Otero, Transnational
Globalism or Internationalist Nationalism: Neoliberal Capitalism and Beyond, 38 LATIN AM.
PERSP. 109, 114 (2011) (“Simply accepting the neoliberal transnational capitalist class’s
terrain of struggle, transnational globalism, [diverts us from] proposing new terms of
engagement focused on a reconstituted, popular-democratic nation-state.”).
142. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 835, 840– 41 (2013) (citing Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (rejecting universal jurisdiction of the
Act on separation of powers grounds)).
143. See, e.g., BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 25, 85-110.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-2\CIN201.txt unknown Seq: 22 23-SEP-15 8:24
300 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 48
The private regulation movement effectively abandons that project,
prescribing instead alternatives to public and democratic governance that
elevate market values and actors to governing status.  The result is to make
regulation an “adjunct to the market,” in Polyani’s words, and thus to create
a global economy in which “social relations . . . [are] embedded in the
economic system” rather than the “economy . . . embedded in social rela-
tions.”144  As this Article has argued, the case for private regulation is
unconvincing because it depends upon ignoring, thereby making invisible,
the real and robust role law plays in enabling and protecting MNCs.  Bring-
ing that role to light is important not only for revealing the true and dis-
turbing vision underlying private regulation— a world where public power
promotes private interests, while public interests depend on private power
for protection— but also for making visible the urgent need and many pos-
sibilities for finding better ways forward.
144. See Muir-Watt, supra note 7, at 421; Shamir, Capitalism, Governance and Author-
ity, supra note 2, at 535 (describing this situation as the “economization of authority”).
